

From The Enchantment of Nature to Fashioning a Persuasive Planetary Ethic¹

Whitney A. Bauman
Florida International University

There are, indeed, an infinite number of worlds for us to fall in love with, each accessible to us through a distinctive intimation of the sacred, each governed by the unique other as its center, each constituting a distinctive hierophany. Even as it pierces the heart with its heterogeneity, each of these worlds awakens our repressed longing to spend ourselves completely and profligately, in a way analogous to worship. Each of them has the capacity to touch us with its promise of inexhaustible plenitude. [...] What if all these worlds are only so many blind alleys promising everything but leading nowhere? If we enter wholly inside any one of them, and lose ourselves in it, it will seem to be a complete universe from which nothing has been left out. But does not the very fact that there is an inside and an outside to each of these worlds suggest that none of them can be as all-encompassing as it promises to be? In surrendering to it because it liberates us from the ordinary, are we in danger of being imprisoned anew? (Jerome Miller 84-85)

Enchantment, dis-enchantment, and re-enchantment are tropes well-known when it comes to thinking about religion/spirituality and the environment; but what do these words really mean? *Enchantment* comes from the Latin *incantare*, to chant in (upon), or *cantare*, to sing (upon). As such, it has associations with magic spells: to sing upon or make magical the world, a life, a person, or not. Are we talking about the desire to re-sing, re-chant the world? Are we longing to make the world magical again, to see it beyond the categories of reason, as we would a song? If so, do we as humans perform as "composers" on the "instruments" of the world? Or, is nature the song that we merely help sing? How should we understand this "nature" that was once enchanted, has become dis-encharnted, and now needs re-enchantment?

We have been here before ... caught in this same refrain.² Carolyn Merchant's *Reinventing Eden* (2004) offers a critique of this refrain: namely, that somehow the origin of life was pure, that we human beings have caused nature to fall, and that, as a result, we are now stuck in either narratives of decline toward an ultimate demise, or in progressive narratives of recovering what has been lost. However, what if this song of origin, loss, and recovery proves no longer capable of keeping time, or of making sense

¹ I want to thank the anonymous reviewers for helping me to make this a better article. Their refractions on this article led me down lines of flight I would have otherwise missed.

² I mean to invoke Deleuze and Guattari's use of "the refrain" in *A Thousand Plateaus*: "we call a refrain any aggregate of matters of expression that draws a territory and develops into territorial motifs and landscapes" (323). What we need to remember is that "the refrain remains a formula evoking a character or landscape, instead of itself constituting a rhythmic character of melodic landscape" (349). Hence we require a new song, with new refrains as I argue here. I thank Sam Mickey and Elizabeth McAnally for our many fruitful conversations on Deleuze and Guattari. I also thank the John Templeton Award for Theological Promise and the Wabash Center for Teaching and Learning for providing some of the funding that enabled me to complete this article.

of matter and making the senses matter? What if now we need to *fashion* new songs, new compositions that take us beyond this old refrain, beyond loss and recovery? Maybe it is time we begin to think anew, to see where we can go beyond the discourse of enchantment, and to ponder what such a territory and the path leading to it might both look like?

Enchantment, disenchantment, and re-enchantment constitute one group of terms among many that reinforce the idea that humans are somehow apart from nature, living in a linear history, and that we enjoy ultimate power over nature. In other words, the language of enchantment has done little to take us out of the Modern understanding of what it means to be a human living within the world. This Modern view suggests a demarcation between that which is human and the rest of the natural world. In general, agency in this equation lies entirely with (some) humans (women and “primitive” or “deviant” “others” are often left out of or made to matter less). Whether we are talking about improving, saving, or re-enchanting nature, the Modern understanding of humans as the locus of value and/or agency is maintained. What might shift us out of this discursive network of the modern *anthropos* and into one of what Gayatri Spivak might call a planetary *anthropos* (71-102)? That is what this short article aims to explore. “Enchantment” language in reference to nature will never move us out of the discourse of Modernity/Postmodernity because it depends upon the modern distinctions of human history and nature, culture and nature, God/divinity/the sacred and the world; all of these distinctions miss the critically constructive process by which humans fashion meanings from within ecological and social contexts.

The language of “Enchantment” in reference to nature fails, I would argue, for three reasons. First, it gives the Modern world too much credit for actually “dis-enchanting” nature instead of recognizing Modern, “dead nature,” as one form of nature among many. Thus, it fails to account for the fact that “mechanism” itself also works as an enchantment, a song if you will, of the natural-cultural world. Put another way, the “Death of Nature” represents more a truth regime, an epistemic score that humans live into and tend towards rather than a definitive ontological moment in the historical past. In fact, the more we sing the song of mechanism, the more we move toward “the Death of Nature.” In a way similar to Bruno Latour’s argument that “we have never been modern,” the world has never, in this account, been dis-enchanted:

Driving away the mountain gods does not reveal the mountain to be an inert place devoid of any sacred power. Rather it reveals the mountain to be harbouring a new form of sacred power, that of coal. Coal is not here simple ‘stuff’, but during the Great Leap Forward was the means by which China would achieve its Great Leap Forward into the future. It was, in effect, the numinous substance that was essential in the concoction of a new elixir of immortality: steel. (James Miller 116)

Miller's quote highlights the fact that, for a people living prior to the Industrial Revolution and to Modern Medicine, where life was much shorter and taken by disease, famine, etc., the power of transforming nature was indeed an enchantment of the world. Much has been written on the differences and similarities between Modern science and magic, but both are magical, enchanting.

Second, enchantment, dis-enchantment, and re-enchantment fall into the trap of foundationalism (and the place-based ethics/aesthetics derived from the latter). In other words, arguing that the world is enchanted or not remains tied to ethico-political interests intent on proving that a certain way of interacting with "nature" is, well, "natural," or "right" and "good." Though I am mainly speaking of Western and Christian forms of foundationalism that would identify anything as natural, God-given, or *a priori*, I also hold that wherever it manifests, such foundationalism "backgrounds" the co-constructive process of nature and can lead to oppressive politics.³ As Haraway notes, this "god-trick" of foundationalism only recapitulates hierarchy, and thus puts an end to dialogue (*Simians, Cyborgs, and Women* 189). It has been used as much to claim "purity" as to claim "perversity," and both designations generate violence. The vision of nature as "sacred," "pure," and "enchanted" can also lead to the reification of one's idea of nature and, therefore, once again to the "death of nature."⁴ Thus, I argue, the move from an ontological-based ethics toward an ethic based upon aesthetic persuasion trips up the logic by which foundational categories yield domination and violence.

Third and finally, the discourse of enchantment, dis-enchantment, and re-enchantment falls into the "Western" trap of linear thinking: we are in a narrative that moves from Eden to a fall, and then to a re-capturing of paradise or ultimate demise. What if, rather, we thought of time as rhizomatic (Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus* 3-25) or "collecting and re-collecting" (Latour, *Politics of Nature* 53-90)? In this respect, pasts and futures are contained and mixed up in the present. There is no succession of pure moments of history disconnected from the other, but all of time is wrapped up in different conglomerations of the present. The present moment coincides more with the flow of time rather than with some ontological unit, so that "the totality of the universe resemble[s] a 'pond of matter in which there exist different flows and waves'" (Deleuze, *The Fold* 5).

Given these three main critiques, a planetary environmental aesthetic, based upon a radical notion of immanence and paying attention to the sensibilities of

³ The notion of "backgrounding" comes from Val Plumwood (*Environmental Culture* 104). Though she contends elsewhere that giving up "nature" is problematic ("The Concept of a Cultural Landscape," and "Toward a Progressive Naturalism"), I will argue in this piece that this is mostly based upon her assumption that Post-Modernity critiques the category of "nature" without critiquing "humanism."

⁴ Here I am reminded of the sacred Ganges that could not be polluted if not venerated by humans, or of the wilderness idea of "nature" (without humans) that both removes people from nature and sections off parts of it as sacred in the form of national parks.

movement and change, may be more persuasive when dealing with contemporary natural-cultural issues such as global climate change. This shift in thinking re-situates the argument of enchanted or not, an ontological if not metaphysical debate, within the relational and ethical task of co-fashioning planetary realities (or regimes of truth) that we want to live towards. After a brief critique of the transcendent language of “enchantment”, it is indeed relevant and essential to move on to the constructive project of fashioning an environmental aesthetic. For the act of fashioning, if anything, reveals the incredible importance of aesthetic persuasion. Most especially, this act can help shine a light on the fact that all meaning-making projects, even those claiming some sort of transcendence or objectivity such as Modernity, are made from very specific natural-cultural contexts and return to shape those contexts. In other words, fashioning language highlights the co-constructed assemblages of bodies and of what we call “natural,” thereby focusing on movement rather than stasis. It is, precisely, on the pace of movement rather than on the impossible choice of movement vs. stasis (or inertia) that a planetary aesthetic lens should focus our attention. The persuasive power of Modern thinking, as I will argue, lies in its denial that it is one of many fashionings. In denying its own historical contexts, Modern Thought (including Modern Science) covers over the fact that it amounts, in large part, to the continuation of the persuasive power of a transcendent monotheism in which God and Revelation are replaced with Reason and Natural Laws. Such covering places Modern Science in a position of authority over and against many other forms of knowledge, often referred to as “traditional ecological knowledge,” as if Modern Science and other Modern modes of thinking were not just one form of enchantment among many.

Modern Nature as One among Many

How could we be capable of disenchanting the world, when every day our laboratories and our factories populate the world with hundreds of hybrids stranger than those of the day before? (Latour, *We Have Never Been Modern*, 115).

In his book, *Nous n'avons jamais été modernes* (1991), Bruno Latour develops the idea that the very notion of Modernity relies on the distinction between “nature” and “culture” (*We Have Never Been Modern* 104). Throughout, he argues that in reality, one side of the nature-culture continuum is always “backgrounded” (Plumwood, *Environmental Culture* 104) and subsequently used as the transcendent foundation for the opposite side of the continuum. In his words, “Modern” designates two different sets of practices: that of translation (which is backgrounded) and of purification (which is asserted). Translation “creates mixtures between entirely new types of beings, hybrids of nature and culture,” while purification “creates two entirely distinct ontological zones: that of human beings on the one hand; that of nonhumans on the

other” (Latour, *We Have Never Been Modern* 10-11). Modernity backgrounds the practice of translation which would show that we are all, as Donna Haraway asserts, cyborgs, or mixtures of nature-cultures, human-nonhuman, self-other, past-present, ideas-matter, etc. (Haraway, *Simians* 149-182). The process of backgrounding occurs through positing foundations for knowledge/epistemology and being/ontology in nature, society, God, *a priori* ideas, or other *sui generis* “god-tricks”⁵ (a point which will be returned to in the next section). This backgrounding of the translation processes through transcendent foundations results in purification, i.e. the very goal that the project of Modernity claims for itself. In other words, alleging that is solely a process of purification and nothing else, Modern epistemology posits that all reality can be ordered in non-continuous terms of human/non-human, culture/nature, modern/pre-modern, self/other, God/world, and so on. Moderns, as Henri Bergson noted about both Rationalists and Empiricists, “mistake *partial notations* [or categories/ or what Latour calls quasi-subjects/objects] for *real parts*” (Bergson 34).

This quick and “dirty” analysis of Latour’s work matters in this discussion because the language of enchantment, disenchantment, and re-enchantment fits squarely within the Modern “problem.” The only way we can think of nature as “dis-enchanted” is if we “buy” into the Modern partitioning-off, separation, and backgrounding of the links between nature-cultures, and create “nature” as a pure category available for exploitation by the Modern Mind, especially the Western Modern mind according to which many other cultures/peoples are placed closer to the category of “nature.” In other words, claiming the world to be “Modern” or “Post-Modern” imposes upon the whole globe categories from within a specific historical trajectory.

Val Plumwood argues that this process creates three types of categorical mistakes. The first, which she calls “naturalizing 1,” refers to the process by which (in this case) Modernity is equated with “natural” in a way that hides its own construction. The second error Plumwood sees is “over-humanizing,” whereby Modern Reason assumes that the rest of the natural world operates by its own logic. The third categorical mistake, or “naturalizing 2,” is the process by which other humans who operate from a different way of understanding the world get naturalized or placed into a context that is “closer to nature” (Plumwood, “The Concept of a Cultural Landscape” 132-133; “Toward a Progressive Naturalism” 38-39). Plumwood contends that we still ought to keep the category of nature, but does not sufficiently address how “keeping nature” must to some extent maintain the separation of humans from it. Her argument is that Postmoderns deconstruct “nature” without deconstructing humanism. She writes, “Humanism must come to terms with an affirmation of the denied nonhuman side of the

⁵ The term is Donna Haraway's and designates these foundational assertions that end dialogue and conversation (*The Companion Species Manifesto* 25).

dominant culture that is labeled nature if it is ever to find a satisfactory form for its human application” (Plumwood, “Toward a Progressive Naturalism” 30). She somehow misses the works of Bruno Latour, who calls for doing away with *both* nature and culture. Likewise, she overlooks those of Donna Haraway, who always argues for blurring the boundaries of human-nature-technology *precisely because* this challenges the agential and value superiority of humans *vis-à-vis* the rest of the natural world. If we hold on to some sort of “nature” as free of human influence, or free of the influence of human meaning-making, then we also hold on to a transcendent place whereby a whole hierarchy of oppressions can be enforced. As Deborah Bird Rose notes, “It is essential that we not mistake an inability to hear for an absence of communication” from the rest of the natural world (Rose 183). At the same time, it is essential that we not mistake “hearing” with hearing the voice of *raw* nature *unmediated* by human experience. Such raw hearing, enchanting though it may be, does nothing to prevent the desire to then impose that one interpretation of “nature” over the face of the entire globe.

The language of “re-enchantment” does nothing to upset the Modern fallacy of separation between natures and cultures, or between non-human and human life. In fact, it buys into the separation by ignoring Latour’s assertion that we have never really been Modern. It assumes that “Modern” is something we have passed through that must be moved on from, perhaps in the form of Post-Modernity or in the form of a romantic reclamation of a “pre-Modern” enchanted nature. In doing so, it continues what I see as the violence of purification set about by the Modern project: the severance of humans from the rest of the natural world. Only now, humans are seen as the stewards or caretakers of a valuable nature rather than nature as merely instrumental to human means. This stewardship model can still lead to a colonizing approach to the non-human, as critiques of colonial environmental practices have argued (see Adams and Mulligan). The projection of monological versions of what both “human” and “nature” *are*, result in violence toward the diversity of nature-cultures that actually exist. These monological visions do not question the hidden foundations that background the relations between humans and nature.

Foundationalism, as I am imagining it here is an epistemology in which there is thought to be a one-to-one correlation between *a priori*, intuited, sensed, reasoned, or revealed ideas and reality. Through these foundations, the eco-socio-historical contextuality of thought remains unacknowledged and becomes instead backgrounded, so that these foundations serve as “natural” or “universal.” They take the form of truth-claims that cannot be questioned. These types of “truth claims are a way of closing down discussion, or ending critical dialogue, of invoking authoritarian standards” (Harding 145). These types of foundations are only made possible through the project of purification and backgrounding. Both Idealism and Materialism represent forms of

foundations, the former in Ideas/Revelation, the latter in Nature. These foundations, whether revealed *a priori* or “natural,” are just what is. In other words, the networks of nature-cultures in which knowledge is constructed get ignored, these “truths” then becoming self-evident as if they had been discovered *ex nihilo*. As such, they cannot be questioned but must be accepted as universal by everyone everywhere. This, in a nutshell, is the problem with the colonial episteme.

As Félix Guattari notes, “By their very essence, analytic cartographies extend beyond the existential territories to which they are assigned” (Guattari 40). In the colonial mind, the use of foundational thought solves the problem of the relationship between subject/object, or thought and its object, by projecting pure, transcendent categories onto the material world and backgrounding the remainder, the in-between, the relationship between categories. Deborah Bird Rose speaks of such a process as imposing the “year-zero” upon places in the process of colonization. In this process, “The left hand creates the *tabula rasa* [of the uncivilized] upon which the right hand will inscribe civilization” (Rose 62). Furthermore, in *Politiques de la Nature* (1999), Bruno Latour argues that this type of foundationalism serves to make nature apolitical. We must simply accept the way things are as dictated to us by the natural sciences or religious revelations, or categories provided by “the experts” (see Latour, *Politics*). Ideas of progress, getting closer to Reality, finding one’s “true nature” all play into such foundational ways of thinking. It is for this reason that critics such as Timothy Morton, Bruno Latour, Donna Haraway, and many others argue that we should do away with foundational categories of “nature” and “culture” and re-think our realities in some hybrid fashion.

The same type of foundationalism operates in an ethics of place. In order for a foundationally based ethic to work, there must be distinct ontological categories that define identities, as well as clear distinctions between species, between culture and nature, between the times of past, present, and future, etc. These transcendent *places*, then, are imposed upon the places of actual bodies, species, “nature”, and time. The language of enchantment falls within this ontological placed-based thinking. The sensibilities of “enchantment” language are focused on making claims about the place/space of whatever “Nature” means rather than on the sensibilities of the *movement* between categories (human/other animal, culture/nature, etc.) that construct the very meanings of nature into which we then begin to live. Place-based language tends simply to reify “nature” as a foundational category and, subsequently, humans as somehow still operating outside of the rest of the natural world. This desire for purity fits well with the very Modern notions that reality is “out there” and that with the right human attentiveness; it is waiting for us all to discover it. Many who want to hold on to nature, fail to take seriously the implications of maintaining that we can never extricate ourselves from our eco-historical contexts to some sort of “pure nature.” As such, a

focus on place and attachment to that place will never sufficiently avoid some sort of parochialism or understanding of what “nature” really is.

What we need in forming a planetary aesthetic is critically-constructive dialogue that does not fall into an enforced notion of “enchanted” nature or place. Historically, ideas of “wild” nature (an enchanting idea of nature to be sure) led to the removal of peoples from lands as well as to the disruption of the complex relations between other humans and the lands and animals on which they subsisted. Very much in the same vein, any view of “enchanted” nature that backgrounds the “quasi” purity of its concepts of “nature” and “culture” runs the risk of mistaking a vision of nature for *the* vision of it and of imposing it globally. Such colonial approaches to nature maintain the idea both that the separation of humans and nature is ontologically justified, and that recognizing this distinction partakes of an inevitable, linear movement in the progress of history. The move from ontology to ethics participates in either the naturalistic (is to ought) or the supernaturalistic (ought to is) fallacy. Claiming that we can know what to do based upon what Nature tells us is the case—i.e. falling prey to the naturalistic fallacy—or claiming that Reason or intuited ideas give us our nature and ethics—i.e. embracing the supernaturalistic fallacy—these are both, in fact, monological projections that do not pay attention to the relations between nature-culture, ideas-matter, etc.⁶ Again, this ontological justification of ethics depends upon a totalization of reality through linear time.

The Time of the Global, the Space-Time of the Planetary

In his book, *The Re-enchantment of Nature* (2002), Alister McGrath writes:

The basic theme of this book is simple. It suggests that we reclaim the idea of nature as God’s creation and act accordingly, bringing attitudes and actions into line with beliefs. [...] And more than this: we must see nature as a continual reminder and symbol of a future renewed creation, a world that we do not yet know but believe to lie over the horizons of our human existence. It is as if we are homesick for a lost Eden, longing for a fulfillment that we know lies ahead of us but have not yet found. The natural order, as God’s richly signed creation, is thus our place of living and hoping. (McGrath 184-185)

Though his vision is clearly Christian, McGrath reveals the problem with the Modern concept of linear time which nourishes the language of enchantment, disenchantment, and re-enchantment. It goes something like this: creation has an origin and order that we can know, we have strayed from this origin and order, and we must regain it somehow.

⁶ Despite the contrast usually made between the naturalistic and supernaturalistic fallacies, I would argue that deriving ethics from either nature or ideals amounts, in each case, to a “supernaturalistic” fallacy: that is, both approaches participate in imposing ideas about nature as foundations for ethics. In actuality, the naturalistic fallacy, moving from what is to what ought to be, is impossible because “what is” is already always a projection rather than an ontological foundation.

Whether or not there is a God to ensure restoration, the linear project of history marches on (even in Marxism!). This understanding of time places (Modern) humans on the side of active history, whereas pre-Moderns and the non-human world get relegated on the side of passive nature. This progressive time draws sustenance from the separation of culture and nature (by backgrounding the relations therein) and from foundational thinking: there is a progressive movement from origin toward the present and toward the future (which actually boils down to a re-capturing of past inertia). This “tunnel of time” reifies all of reality in a (Euro-) linear time stretching from creation and fall to redemption; from primitive to civilized; from undeveloped to developed; from religious superstition to Enlightened science; from enchantment to disenchantment and re-enchantment; and a number of other linear tropes all coming out of the process of colonization.⁷ Whether it is based on belief in a restoration of creation by God, or faith in progress through science and the project of modernization, this understanding of time gives us our ethics. It is an ethic derived from ontology and metaphysics and must thus be adhered to rather than challenged or questioned. As Latour notes, “The notion of an irreversible arrow—progress or decadence—stems from an ordering of quasi-objects, whose proliferation the moderns cannot explain” (*We Have Never Been Modern* 73). In other words, this ethics depends upon the separation of the designations “culture” and “nature” without ever questioning whether or not the two are actually separate. It is always caught in the project of classifying human beings as “more” or “less” modernized, knowledgeable, and/or enlightened.

Just as Modernity supposedly dis-enchanted nature, now Post-Modernity or whatever comes next is responsible for “re-enchanting” nature. Another result of this linear time, with movement toward ultimate “progress” or “decline”, is that everything must be ordered in relation to its all-inclusiveness. In other words, we have here the problem of (w)holism: “Once being is thought in relation to the Whole or the One, the series of conditions are organized into a hierarchy on a transcendent plane—the organization of essences transcends the existence of individuals” (Goodchild 158-159). In such a scheme, categories and the ethics derived from them are continually dictated from above. Placed-based thinking often forces such (w)holistic categories upon the movement of life by relating to other locations in terms of how they fit into its own notion of place and History. Such a process backgrounds the global flows that daily intersect all places.

Deborah Bird Rose argues almost the exact opposite. She agrees that in a transcendent notion of linear time, places are made empty so that a culture of progress can be reinscribed on them (Rose 61-62). She favors instead a notion of “eco-place” (168) that would help us understand that time is not dictated by humans, but is rather

⁷ Sandra Harding describes the “tunnel of time” well (25).

multi-directional and consists of the interactions between and among relations in a given place. Against any notion of linear time, such "eco-place" helps us to realize "co-mingled times" (26) where "there is no former time/space of wholeness to which we might return or which we might resurrect for ourselves. Nor is there a posited future wholeness which may yet save us" (24). The same notion of mixed-time opens us to the textures of our evolving contexts. While I agree with Rose's critique of linear time and the need for receptivity to the "co-mingled" times of various places a place-based identity quickly slips into a monological way of conceiving nature and what ought to be done in terms of human interaction with the rest of the natural world. In other words, the idea that one finds deep connections with a place suggests a depth that can become foundational and thereby naturalizes a specific narrative about place across the face of the globe. Place-based ethics opt for extending the concept of the individual (and all that entails) to specific locales rather than going for a more biocentric, planetary understanding of "nature." Such a decision is fine as long as it is made clear that place-based thinking remains just as constructed as other models of the natural world, a reality I do not believe place-based thinking very prone to admit.

Instead of continuing to base ethics in ontology and metaphysics, and thereby universalizing them for all times and all places (a continuation of the fallacy of the Modern separation and its ethical handmaiden rooted in sensibilities of place/space), perhaps we ought to develop a more ethical concept of time anchored in a network of relations, or the sensibilities of space-time and movement. This might produce an ethics without foundations, without the purification of categories, and without the metaphysics of time. It is no random coincidence that Carolyn Merchant's book, *Reinventing Eden* (2004), which critiques the arrow of time, whether conceived of as progressive or declensionist, ends with a chapter on "relations" in terms of contemporary thinking about chaos and complexity. From this perspective, she develops her understanding of "partnership ethics." Merchant attempts to move ethics away from the discourse of metaphysics and ontology to the one of contextual relations and negotiations. This requires a sensibility of movement and change over that of place/space. Moving away from the Modern project of purification, foundational thinking, and linear time does not leave us with relativism; rather, it leaves us with *contextualism*. I now turn to some examples of this type of ethics, based upon the sensibilities of space-time and movement, or sensibilities that focus on the *pace* (rather than place) of space-time.

The Pace of Planetary Environmental Aesthetics: Points of Departure

Entering a different space-time of thinking and becoming is no small task; and this examination cannot be expected to exhaust the topic. Instead, what I propose here

should be seen as “points of departure” or catalysts for discussion. Re-thinking the categories of purification in terms of hybrids, tricksters, cyborgs, and partners (Haraway, Merchant), re-shaping foundational thought in terms of rhizomatic or nomadic thought (Deleuze), and re-fashioning linear time and the ethics derived from it in terms of the collective (Latour) and planetarity (Spivak), all these approaches may offer us a more helpful way to navigate the issues bequeathed to us in this post-colonial era of global climate change. My hope is to begin to shift the focus on the ontological tropes of enchantment to a focus on an aesthetic choice between “globalization” and “planetarity.” In other words, I seek to move the discussion from the Modern, *place*-based, ontological choice between “enchanted” and “dis-enchanted” nature to that of a *pace*-based ethical choice of how we relate to and perform with one another as well as with the rest of the natural-cultural world.

Regarding this shift, the work of Donna Haraway and Carolyn Merchant provide good starting points. Both of these thinkers have challenged the Modern project of purification of categories. Donna Haraway argues that we only exist in nature-cultures, that we are hybrids, cyborgs of the natural-cultural and physical-mental, that we are machine-biology (*Simians*, 150-157). There is no getting beyond to any pure form; in fact, the purification process leads to violence toward both human and earth others. Similarly, Carolyn Merchant scrambles the pure distinctions between active history and inactive nature through her understanding of partnership (210-229). Rather than agency being contained by one side of the equation, it is shared. The import of both of these thinkers is that we begin to realize the contours and textures of our worlds. We open up to the idea that we are all hybrids—interactions of nature and culture, past and future, the mental and physical—and that no part of these hybrid mixtures dominates the other. We must pay attention to the multiplicities that all subject-objects are and resist the Modern tendency of abstracting pure categories through backgrounding relations.

In such a mixed reality, there are no longer any transcendent foundations for knowing from which we can recapitulate all life on the planet, the very project of the colonizing mind. Rather than ordering minds or alternatively minds getting “in sync” with nature, we are, as Deleuze and Guattari argue, rhizomatic and nomadic in our thought.⁸ No pure origin, no foundation exists, but only multiple beginnings. Our thoughts do not arise *ex nihilo*, but emerge from the continuous process of open-ended creation. We can find no “whole” already formed within linear time from which we can impose foundations. This yet again puts an end to a monotheistic and monological way of thinking about reality. Instead, what if the world and our concepts of the world are

⁸ In their seminal work *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, Deleuze and Guattari particularly develop the concept of rhizomatic thought in their "Introduction" (3-25) and the one of nomadology in Chapter 12 (351-423).

like “fragmentary wholes” that remain open (Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus* 35-36)? We can go in many directions, our thoughts take flight; some will become more persuasive than others. This constitutes a move toward a polytheistic or at least polydox (see Schneider and Keller) way of understanding reality; this also initiates a polyamorous relationship to spaces/places. Crucially here, knowledge is never pure and cannot have transcendent foundations; instead knowledge reveals itself as contextual, immanent, constructed in nature-cultures, and there are many different possibilities for future directions in thought. Such thinking has deep roots not only in Postmodern deconstructionism, but also in negative theological traditions.⁹ Negative and apophatic forms of theology focus on the “unknowing” of God/Ultimate Reality rather than describing what that reality might be. In a way, negative theology has as much to critique in foundational understandings of nature as in foundational understandings of God. In one sense, the negative theological tradition that leads to the death of God here ends up also calling for the death of “nature.”

Instead of linear time founded in concepts of salvation or returning to some sort of pure relationship with nature, perhaps we could think of time in reference to the “collective” or “planetary becoming”¹⁰ (see Latour, *Politics of Nature*; Spivak). In Latour’s collective, the becoming process never ends; rather, there is collecting, breaking open the collective, and collecting again, *ad infinitum*. Instead of the linear project of time from beginning to end, time is about the relations among humans as well as between humans and the rest of the natural-cultural worlds. Similarly, Gayatri Spivak’s notion of the planetary, posited in direct opposition to the project of globalization, opens us onto *time as relation*. Instead of the linear, monological project of universalizing Modern ideas over the whole planet, we begin to open onto the many different ways of being-becoming in the (human and non-human) world and ask how we want to become together.

Rather than seeking an ontological justification for our ethical and political projects, we begin to realize that we are co-creators of the truth-regimes in the worlds in which we live. The future is radically not closed to how we might become, and thus possibilities for becoming abound. As Latour notes, immanence does not destroy transcendence, but opens transcendence up for discussion! “Deprived of the help of transcendence, we at first believe we are going to suffocate for want of oxygen; then we notice that we are breathing more freely than before: transcendences abound in the propositions that are external to the collective” (Latour, *Politics* 187). In other words, a collapse into immanence really allows for us to recognize the relationships that have

⁹ For recent discussions bringing deconstructionism and apophatic traditions together, see Boesel and Keller.

¹⁰ For a closer definition of the concept of “planetary,” see Keller 130. The notion is also developed at length in Moore and Rivera.

been ignored and backgrounded under the banner of transcendence, thereby opening us up to the recognition and creation of different planetary identities.

We do not have to remain in the modern refrain; we can begin to march to the beat of a different drum, sing different notes, create different scores, and recognize new instruments in the planetary band. We do not have to remain locked in the choices between a symphony and cacophony, the choices set forth by the false separations of Modernity. In reality, these are not choices at all because the symphony merely creates its own cacophony through the process of globalization and through voices excluded by backgrounding. Imposing order creates chaos: “Violence is central to both conquest and to progress” (Rose 4). Perhaps from this radical immanent, planetary perspective, we can begin to join in the polyphony of planetary becoming, a polyphony that is ever-emergent and always becoming, what Ernst Bloch refers to as the “not-yet” (*vol 1*, 75-77).

In this space of response-able becoming, religion and nature become “crossing” sites, or vectors for changes in identities (both individual and communal ones). Furthermore, epistemology becomes ethical and more about aesthetics and persuasion than ontology and metaphysics. The rest of this article will begin describing what a planetary ethic grounded in aesthetic persuasion might look like.

On the Road to Nowhere and Everywhere: Developing A Planetary Ethic of Aesthetic Persuasion

Again, once one decides to take the leap to *epistem-ontology* or the realization that epistemology and ontology are always already co-implicated, and that thus there is no transcendent space from which to make knowledge claims, the option does not have to be relativism. Rather, contextuality and a move toward linking knowledge and becoming—with ethical rather than ontological ends—presents itself as another path. The question of what truths we will live into begins to matter more than what is metaphysically or ontologically True. Truth becomes more linked to persuasion—to that which *compels* toward a “better” or “more beautiful” life.

Fashioning Persuasive Aesthetic-Ethics

Knowledge is embedded in projects; knowledge is always *for*, in many senses, some things and not others, and knowers are always formed by their projects, just as they shape what they can know. Such shapings never occur in some unearthly realm; they are always about the material and meaningful interactions of located humans and nonhumans—machines, organisms, people, land, institutions, money, and many other things. (Haraway, *The Haraway Reader* 200)

Knowledge always involves shaping, molding, and curtailing information from and toward a specific context. In a nutshell, knowledge production is about *fashioning*. In an environmental truth regime that moves beyond the transcendent language of enchantment, the question becomes one of how we might fashion a persuasive environmental ethic in an increasingly globalized world. Drawing from Spivak's concept of planetarity (71-102) and the one of immanence as developed by Deleuze and Guattari in most of their work, I argue for a Planetary Environmental Aesthetic, an *Eco-Couture* if you will. As a result of thinking within a truth-regime of radical immanence, a new aesthetic imagination can form in the world because there are no longer external, universal values/judgments restricting the concepts of beauty, value, and meaning. In other words, there is no more “holding on” to that place which seeks to make all else capitulate toward its own self-understanding. If “environmental” aesthetics and ethics are to be about more than platitudes and self-justification, if they really can constitute interrelated processes whose outcome is unknown, thereby mimicking the processes of evolving earth systems which they wish to defend, then this human-persuasive, political dimension of knowing and being must be taken seriously. This has very real implications. This type of immanent aesthetics, taking into account the sensibility of movement, may lead to new, ecological aesthetics that re-imagine humans within the rest of the natural world and create environmentally sound *couture/* truth regimes that are persuasive. Granted such a link between aesthetics and ethics does not always lead to sound fashion choices, but through an immanent aesthetics, such choices become political and can thereby be placed under public scrutiny rather than remain foundations for recapitulating what is good/bad, beautiful/ugly, or natural/unnatural.

Fashioning Materials, Ideas, and Symbols

The word "fashion" simply means: to make, shape, manner, or mold. It involves people acting together, a making or doing. Understanding humans as “fashioners” is another way of seeing human beings as *Homo Faber*. Both philosophical and religious inquiry are fashion-able. Would not one way of describing philosophy simply be to define it as inquiry that fashions meaning and answers questions about an ultimate reality? Likewise, is this not what religion or the act of *re-ligare/ligere* supposedly concerns itself with: to re-connect, bind together, and to re-read life? Have both religion and philosophy not been about fashioning a life, a way, concepts of who we are, concepts of what nature and culture respectively are, etc.? According to Deleuze, “[t]o define something is not to explain what it means but to explicate what it *is*, i.e. to make or produce it in actuality” (Hallward 75). That which we fashion *matters*. Sociologist Georg Simmel, who wrote one of the first major reflective works on fashion in the early 20th century, also suggests that religion, and I would add philosophy, is involved in the

process of creating forms of meaning, value, and beauty. He writes, “It is the subjective energy that creates and maintains the religious forms,” or rather fashions them (Varga 150). Subjects *fashion* religious forms; among other things, this implies that religious and philosophical knowing are constructive enterprises and that some forms, ideas, and concepts prove more fashionable than others at times.

Roland Barthes views fashion as a form of mythologizing or a “process by which the contingent and historical are raised to something necessary and universally valid”¹¹ (*The Fashion System* 269). As such, we can say that both philosophy and religious traditions have been part of the fashion industry for a long time, whether through rhetoric surrounding what “the good life” is or ought to be, or through institutions that provide adherents with a story of salvation and redemption, or as a way to make meaning out of the whole of one’s life. Religions, especially, have recognized the persuasive power of a sensible aesthetics of movement. Religions have ethical commandments, rituals, and traditions to no small degree because they engage sight, smell, taste, touch, and sound—the common senses. The engagement of the common senses is meant to convert or change identities. Religious paintings, architecture, clothing, incense, and even kitsch, have all played a role in persuading their adherents to convert and remain loyal.

If, as I argue, we are co-producers and co-consumers of symbols, if our identities are fluid, and if we are always involved in co-self-construction *via* the consumption of symbols, then some attention should be paid to the process by which and toward which we produce and consume symbols. From a perspective of radical immanence, religion and philosophy offer meanings in very limited contexts: limited because they recognize that meanings come, go, and morph through time. Thomas Tweed suggests in his theory of religion that the dwelling places of meaning are always already “only for a time” (Tweed 81). From a perspective that moves beyond transcendence, meaning is about contextual meaning-making practices.

The idea that true meaning still lies either deep-down or beyond that which is passing or moving underpins the Modern search for “origin,” “depth,” or “the authentic.” Such quests have caused enough violence, as deconstructionists and post-colonial scholars have shown. Thus, it may be beneficial to move beyond this search in a way that understands better the realities of movement, and in a way that understands places as part of one continually changing “plane of immanence.”¹²

¹¹ On this point, see also Svendsen 68.

¹² Deleuze and Guattari call this plane of immanence nature: “This plane has nothing to do with a form or a figure, nor with a design or a function. Its unity has nothing to do with a ground buried deep within things, nor with an end or a project in the mid of God. Instead, it is a plane upon which everything is laid out. [...] A Plane of immanence or univocality opposed to analogy” (254).

Radical Immanence: Planetary Possibilities beyond Reason and Romance

Throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, especially, there was a significant move in philosophy (a fashionable move), following Nietzsche, to see to it that the Death of God would be complete. This expression means several things, from the death of a Subjective Ordering Principle in the universe called “God,” to the death of all transcendence. These attempts can be seen as an effort to bring thought “down to earth,” and, as another endeavor in a long line of apophatic and negative theologies/philosophies to point out the limits of human knowledge. In parallel with this death, many Romantic philosophers and materialists of all stripes began trying to use the category of “Nature” for the basis of truth and meaning in the world. One might think of this trend as the Enlightenment move from Reason-following-Revelation to that of Reason-discovering-Natural-Laws. In the wake of thinkers such as John Locke, philosophy embraces the idea of a world created orderly by a God that sets up these natural laws and endows the human intellect (the *Imago*) with the ability to “discover” these laws through reason. The shift in rhetoric consisted, generally, in moving from an idea, truth, or value as being “God-given” to that of an idea being “Natural.” The Romantic shift away from rationalization and toward phenomenological approach still seeks this genuine connection to “Nature,” even while pointing out the limitations of Reason and human intellectual projects (culture and technology). In fact, much of environmental aesthetics today is still based upon this shift by Romantics and Transcendentalists to find foundations for truth, value, meaning, and beauty in and/or through the natural world.

In the last half-century, not surprisingly, the idea of “nature” as a solid foundation has been challenged once again.¹³ However, many forms of rhetoric still draw from foundational discourse. In a discourse about beauty that remains grounded in some sort of transcendent space, this discussion would fall under the debate about surface vs. depth. Couching ethical negotiation in terms of surface and depth (a place-based approach) helps to oppositionally define what is important to each camp by systematically leaving out the things claimed by the other and staking an ethical decision in some place: surface (newness) or depth (romantic past). This ontological decision diverts attention away from the reality of movement and change. In moving toward an aesthetic of pace, the conversation also moves toward that of the rate of change. The debate would oppose something like the “precautionary principle” (do not change / hold on to a romantic past) to the worshiping of newness (new is Good). This opposition is

¹³ See, for instance: Butler; Bruno Latour, *Politics of Nature*; and Morton. For a scientist’s queering of “nature as foundation,” see Roughgarden.

luckily already found in ethical decisions that rely on navigating between continuity and change.

I do not blame environmentalism for its disdain of contemporary consumer culture and rejection of the worship of newness: any counter-cultural movement involves refusal of the status quo, and there are serious problems with worshipping newness. Nor do I blame those who are persuaded by an aesthetic of newness: again, many good reasons exist to reject the worship of the past. What often gets lost in this opposition is that both positions suffer from the same blindness: they fail to see that the important ethical questions should be focused on *pace* rather than *place*. The pivotal question, then, is not whether to be fashionable/fake/surface or other-worldly/genuine/deep, but rather what amounts to a viable pace of planetary movement. Teresa Brennan describes this as the necessity to determine what the “regenerative time” of the planet is, and to re-think human cultures within that space-time (Brennan 123-129).

Another point of interaction that opens up when we shift the focus from place to pace is the discourse of embodiment. I need not recount the ways in which transcendent ideals are detrimental to real bodies. When enchanted, place-based environmentalism moves from its idealized concept of nature to real bodies, it is often in order to define what is “natural” and what is “unnatural.” If we follow Foucault, Butler, Haraway, and many others who have looked at the concepts of body and nature, we might say to both camps that we need embodiment without dictating what is and is not “natural” or “ideal.” Instead, perhaps we require discourses of embodiment focused on the exchange between assembled identities in transition (trans-identities). As Helen Cisoux notes, “If you remove all of the clothes, you will not find a ‘natural’ body but a body that is shaped by fashion: the body is not more ‘natural than the clothes it wears’” (qtd. in Svendsen 77). This quote has contextual implications for environmentalists: pay attention to how subjects co-construct embodied identities without the distinctions of natural/unnatural! In other words, environmental visions which throw off culture to find genuine nature are as misplaced as attempts to throw off nature for pure culture. Nature and culture co-define what it means to be human; we are always-already in this mix and this mix returns to affect the rest of the natural world. From these deconstructive elements towards fashioning, how to move toward what we might call an open, evolving planetary aesthetic? This is precisely the question to be examined in the final part of this article.

Ethics on the Move: An Open, Evolving Planetary Aesthetic

Many thinkers have been working on fashioning a new set of symbols for a post-Natural and post-Transcendent world. In such a world, “there is nothing outside

being in relation to which being might be” (Hallward 15). Furthermore, the distinctions that rely on this “outside,” such as surface vs. depth, public vs. private, use vs. non-use, and object vs. subject, among others, are eroded. What replaces the tropes of this “outside” formally known as objective facts, truth, value, and meaning is *persuasive* knowledge toward different ways of becoming in the world. This does not amount to a slip into relativism, but to a recognition that all things in our histories that have posed as Truths, as Universal, or as Objective value and knowledge claims, have taken their role in societies through power and persuasion: “All history is really the history of perception, and what we make history with is the matter of a becoming, not the subject matter of a story” (Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus* 347). In a messy reality, “there is no outside nor is there an inner sanctum in which I can take refuge from univocal forces” (Berleant 7). In this construction, the realm of Nature and the realm of Ideas/Thought are not distinct or separate from one another; neither do they have priority over one another. As Deleuze notes, “thought and nature will coexist as parallel expressions of a single plane of consistency or a single line of variation” (Hallward 11; also see Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus* 338). From within this radical immanence, there exists no Origin or End, which would suggest some place of rest/transcendence, but rather reality unfolds more like a rhizome that can shoot off in many directions with no clear beginning or end (Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus* 1-25). From within this radical immanence, too, “[m]aking a clean slate, starting or beginning again from ground zero, seeking a beginning or a foundation—all imply a false conception of voyage and movement” (Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus* 25). Moreover, they do not even make sense from an immanent perspective. This “pure immanence” means that a distinction between regimes of truth becomes ethical/aesthetic rather than ontological/metaphysical.¹⁴

It is important for the future of environmentalism to include the fashioning of a concept of nature that does not rely merely on place, if predictions about global climate change are true and the very places we seek to preserve begin to change. We will need an environmentalism that reveals itself just as mobile, just as nomadic as the ground from which it emerges.¹⁵ Perhaps part of the reason why the “environmental movement” has been less effective in persuading the world towards a planetary ethic is because it appears out-of-step (like many extant religious traditions) with the movement and change of meanings resulting from the process of globalization. This process is

¹⁴ On “pure immanence,” see Deleuze and Guattari, *What is Philosophy*, chapter 2 (35-60). The plane of immanence “presents only events, that is, possible worlds as concepts, and other people as expressions of possible worlds or conceptual personae” (47-48). See also later in the same book: “Thinking consists in stretching out a plane of immanence that absorbs the earth (or rather, ‘adsorbs’ it)” (88).

¹⁵ This type of nomadism is evolving and contextual. As Deleuze and Guattari put it: “The coupling of the place and the absolute is achieved not in a centered, oriented globalization or universalization but in an infinite succession of local operations” (*A Thousand Plateaus* 383).

characterized by movement and exchange of ideas, places, products, materials, rather than stasis or staying in place. Consider what some call the Millennial generation. The expression refers to the students who were born in the richest third of the world during the 1990s and who fill college and university campuses at this date. These students have never lived in a world without cell phones, the internet, and all of the fast-movement of materials and resources around the globe that both of those technologies imply. They are more likely to text than to call, and to know how to build a website than construct a three-point essay. They are more likely to be comfortable with “on-line” interactions than their professors. For these students, “nature” is often mediated through various technologies. Other, less privileged people who are not the beneficiaries of such technologies are nevertheless also affected (often negatively) by them, as their places and identities are changed through the movement of resources and as information “invades” every region of the planet. This level of mobility creates a shift in what it means to be human *vis-à-vis* the rest of the natural world. Ursula Heise captures this shift well when she discusses the move from the image of the earth as the “little blue ball” to that of “Google earth” (Heise, 17-67). Imagining the single earth image no longer suffices, as this image distorts the ways in which movement of energy and materials affects places differently. To make a persuasive environmental argument, one must take into account this “space-time” crunch out of which, from the present moment into the foreseeable future, each new generation will emerge. This is a planet and a world marked by change. Ignoring that fact and opting for a romantic return to the past (a past which has no grounding for more and more people) would be just as irresponsible as embracing it fully and worshiping the new.

Environmentalism must learn to de-contextualize and re-contextualize, to become more imaginative—and more persuasive—by taking on a new pace that begins from the present and moves forward to alternative future visions, rather than by imposing the past and rejecting the newly emergent altogether. Part of this discussion should include some reflection on the beauty that is also found in tragedy.¹⁶ A pollution sunset, the rainbow in a slick of oil on the water, models who sacrifice their own health and bodies for a particular conception of female perfection, and so many shiny consumer products that (like birds) we use for nesting, these are all forms of tragic beauty. One cannot deny these sorts of beauty, but we must temper that with understanding their tragic side: the pace at which they are produced outstrips the flourishing of planetary life. Contrast this with the beauty of the Grand Canyon, of biodiversity, of communities making living wages and nurturing one another, of consuming in ways that promote planetary flourishing, and the difference between the pace of *slow beauty* and that of *fast beauty* emerges. Newness is beautiful, but newness unto itself can lead to much destruction:

¹⁶ I want to thank Emily Silvermann for a conversation that began to initiate this line of thinking.

there is no *creatio ex nihilo*; rather creation also always involves some amount of destruction. Likewise, there is beauty in the past, but the past cannot be held onto without killing the ongoing process of *creatio continua*. In between the worship of the past and the worship of newness lies the *pace* of planetary flourishing.

Conclusion: Can a Planetary Aesthetic ever be "en Vogue"?

Since I began with the language of enchantment (as understood spiritually), I will end with an etymological reflection on a word from the fashion industry that might capture better a pace-based ethic, namely *vogue*. The etymological origin of the French "*voguer*" means to row, sway, or set sail. The hope for every new fashioning is that it will be *en vogue*, just as the hope for every song (*cantare*) is that it will "catch on." There is always a possibility of failure, of sinking, of not being heard, of not swaying, of not sailing. What causes a fashion—philosophical, religious, or material—to be in vogue? A planetary pace-based aesthetic should begin with this very question—one pertaining to truth, meaning, and value, one that has become contextual, with text, with time, with space, and with material others. Environmental rhetoric and the environmental movement should also be asking this question: how can we fashion a vision that will be *en vogue*? As Svendsen puts it: "We must choose a lifestyle and, as a style, the choice is basically an aesthetic one" (141). I have been arguing throughout that an aesthetic based upon radical immanence will focus our attention more on the movements of everyday lives rather than on the abstract concept of place. Such transcendent notions as "the individual," "place," "nature," or "God," help foster an illusion that there exists a place in which things do not move, which remains somehow beyond the flux of everyday exchanges of materials and energies. This, I have contended here, may be a source of the reification of life, and may actually lead to ecological and social violence rather than ecological thriving and justice. Further, an environmental aesthetic and corresponding ethic based upon radical immanence will help focus us onto the contours of the changing planet better than one based upon a return to a pure nature or "genuine connection" with place. Such metaphors always already suggest that humans are at some level disconnected from the rest of the natural world. Metaphors that belie this miss the importance of connection in persuading bodies toward visions of a planetary future. The environmental community should become more concerned with questions of the pace of aesthetic movement in order to bring people towards its vision—its new, more fluid "truth regime"—of "the good life." Song, voyage, fashioning, and religion are all nouns of action and can be fruitful in an analysis of the pace of the planetary.

Concepts are like sails: this pace of the planetary needs enough wind to "set sail" and be "in vogue." If that wind is not there, the boat sits dead in the water: it makes

no connections. This may be fine from an Enlightenment, foundational perspective—who cares whether an idea is persuasive when it is, by definition, already either true or not, right or wrong? But, from a perspective of radical immanence, truths must endlessly perform the task of persuasion and the concepts fashioned have to pay attention to the *Zeitgeist*. There is no more safe space from which to judge on-high!

According to Schiller, the purpose of the “aesthetic instinct” in human beings is “to create order or to give a form to social interaction without suppressing our sensual instincts and drives” (qtd. in Gronow 155). As such, this instinct can function as an important component that bridges our ordering concepts and symbols with an already evolving, open, planetary world. Otherwise, symbols serve to reify life and thus lead to some form of tyranny. Many utopian, science fiction, and totalitarian scenarios tend to leave out fashion: all are “uniformed” because, apparently, time has “arrived.” In this rhizomatic, immanent reality which I am describing and which requires that the persuasive be endlessly renewed, there is no arrival: “Fashion never is—it is always in a state of becoming” (Svendsen 34). Like “nature,” fashion is never in stasis, but always changing; so it is with the process of human becoming toward *meaning-full* visions of a planetary community.

Works Cited

- Adams, William and Martin Mulligan, eds. *Decolonizing Nature: Strategies for Conservation in a Postcolonial Era*. London: Earthscan, 2003. Print.
- Barthes, Roland. *The Fashion System*. Trans. Matthew Ward and Richard Howard. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983. Print. Trans. of *Système de la mode*, 1967.
- Bergson, Henri. *An Introduction to Metaphysics*. Trans. TE Hulme. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1999. Print. Trans. of *Introduction à la métaphysique*, 1903.
- Berleant, Arnold. *Environment and the Arts: Perspectives on Environmental Aesthetics*. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002. Print.
- Bloch, Ernst. *The Principle of Hope*. 3 vols. Trans. Nevile Plaice, Steven Plaice, and Paul Knight Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986. Print. Trans. of *Das Prinzip Hoffnung*, 1938-1947
- Boesel, Chris and Catherin Keller, eds. *Apophatic Bodies: Negative Theology, Incarnation, and Relationality*. New York, NY: Fordham University Press, 2009. Print.
- Brennan, Teresa. *Exhausting Modernity: Grounds for a New Economy*. New York: Routledge, 2000. Print.
- Butler, Judith. *Gender Trouble*. 1990. New York: Routledge, 1999. Print.

- Deleuze, Gilles. *Pure Immanence: Essays on a Life*. Trans. Ann Boyman. New York: Zone Books, 2001. Print.
- . *The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque*. Trans. Tom Conley. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993. Print. Trans. of *Le Pli: Leibniz et le baroque*, 1988.
- Deleuze, Gilles and Félix Guattari. *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*. Trans. Brian Massumi. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987. Print. Trans. of *Mille plateaux: capitalisme et schizophrénie*, 1980.
- . *What is Philosophy?* Trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell. New York: Columbia University Press, 1996. Print. Trans. of *Qu'est-ce que la philosophie?*, 1991.
- Goodchild, Phillip. "Why is Philosophy so Compromised with God?" *Deleuze and Religion*. Ed. Mary Bryden. London: Routledge, 2001. 156-166. Print.
- Guattari, Félix. *The Three Ecologies*. Trans by Ian Pindor and Paul Sutton. London, UK: Continuum, 2000. Print. Trans. of *Les trois écologies*, 1989
- Gronow, Jukka. *The Sociology of Taste*. London, UK: Routledge, 1997. Print.
- Hallward, Peter. *Out of this World: Deleuze and the Philosophy of Creation*. New York: Verso, 2006. Print.
- Haraway, Donna. *The Companion Species Manifesto: Dogs, People, and Significant Otherness*. New York, NY: Prickly Paradigm, 2003. Print.
- . *The Haraway Reader*. New York, NY: Routledge, 2004. Print.
- . *Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The Reinvention of Nature*. New York, NY: Routledge, 1991. Print.
- Harding, Sandra. *Is Science Multicultural: Postcolonialisms, Feminisms, and Ecology*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1998. Print.
- Heise, Ursula. *Sense of Place and Sense of Planet: The Environmental Imagination of the Global*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2008. Print.
- Keller, Catherine. *God and Power: Counter-Apocalyptic Journeys*. Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 2005. Print.
- Latour, Bruno. *Politics of Nature: How to Bring the Sciences into Democracy*. Trans. Catherine Porter. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004. Print. Trans. of *Politiques de la nature. Comment faire entrer les sciences en démocratie*, 1999.
- . *We Have Never Been Modern*. Trans. Catherine Porter. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993. Print. Trans. of *Nous n'avons jamais été modernes. Essai d'anthropologie symétrique*, 1991.
- McGrath, Alister. *The Re-enchantment of Nature: The Denial of Religion and the Ecological Crisis*. New York, NY: Doubleday, 2002. Print.
- Merchant, Carolyn. *Reinventing Eden: The Fate of Nature in Western Culture*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2004. Print.

- Miller, James. "Religion, Nature and Modernization in China." *Technology, Trust and Religion*. Ed. Willem B. Drees. Leiden: Leiden University Press, 2009. 107-122. Print.
- Miller, Jerome. *In the Throe of Wonder: Intimations of the Sacred in a PostModern World*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1992. Print.
- Moore, Stephen D., and Mayra Rivera, eds. *Planetary Loves: Spivak, Postcoloniality, and Theology*. New York, NY: Fordham University Press, 2010. Print.
- Morton, Timothy. *Ecology Without Nature: Rethinking Environmental Aesthetics*. Boston, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007. Print.
- Plumwood, Val. "The Concept of a Cultural Landscape: Nature, Culture, and Agency in the Land." *Ethics and the Environment* 11.2 (2006): 115-150. Print.
- . *Environmental Culture: The Ecological Crisis of Reason*. New York, NY: Routledge, 2002. Print.
- . "Toward a Progressive Naturalism." *Recognizing the Authority of Nature*. Ed. Thomas Heyd. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2005. 25-53. Print.
- Rose, Deborah Bird. *Reports from a Wild Country: Ethics for Decolonization*. Sydney, NSW: University of New South Wales Press, 2004. Print.
- Roughgarden, Joan. *Evolution's Rainbow: Diversity, Gender, and Sexuality in Nature and People*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2004. Print.
- Schneider, Laurel and Catherine Keller, eds. *Polydoxy: Theology of Multiplicity and Relation*. New York, NY: Routledge, 2011. Print.
- Spivak, Gayatri. *The Death of a Discipline*. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2003. Print.
- Svendsen, Lars. *Fashion: A Philosophy*. Trans. John Irons. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2006. Print. Trans. of *Mote: Et Filosofisk Essay*, 2004.
- Tweed, Thomas. *Crossing and Dwelling: A Theory of Religion*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006. Print.
- Varga, Ivan. "Georg Simmel: Religion and Spirituality." *A Sociology of Spirituality*. Eds. Kieran Flanagan and Peter Lupp. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007. 145-160, Print.